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An approach to auctions and bidding is founded on obser-
vations and expectations of the opponents' behavior and
not on assumptions concerning the opponents' motivations
or internal reasoning. The approach draws ideas from in-
formation theory. A bidding agent employs maximum en-
tropy inference to determine its actions on the basis of this
uncertain data. Maximum entropy inference may be ap-
plied both to multi-issue and to single-issue negotiation.





Game theory, dating back to the work of John von Neu-
mann and Oscar Morgenstern, provides the basis for the
analysis of auctions and bidding. There is a wealth of mate-
rial in this analysis [1] originating with the work of William
Vickrey. Fundamental to this analysis is the central role of
the utility function, and the notion of rational behavior by
which an agent aims to optimize its utility, when it is able to
do so, and to optimize its expected utility otherwise. Anal-
yses that are so founded on game theory are collectively
referred to as game theoretic, or GT.
The application of GT to the design of auction mech-
anisms has been both fruitful and impressive - rational
behavior provides a theoretical framework in which mech-
anism performance may be analyzed. A notable example
being the supremely elegant Generalized Vickrey mecha-
nism [2]. GT also leads to prescriptive results concerning
agent behavior, such as the behavior of agents in the pres-
ence of hard deadlines [3]. The general value of GT as
a foundation for a prescriptive theory of agent behavior is
limited both by the extent to which an agent knows its own
utility function, and by its certainty in the probability distri-
butions of the utility functions (or, types) of its opponents.
In some negotiations - such as when an agent buys
a hat, a car, a house or a company - she may not know
her utility with certainty. Nor may she be aiming to op-
timize anything - she may simply want to buy it. Fur-
ther, she may be even less certain of her opponents' types,
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or whether her opponents are even aware of the concept
of utility. In such negotiations, an agent may be more
driven towards establishing a feeling of personal "comfort"
through a process of information acquisition, than by a de-
sire to optimize an uncertain personal utility function.
A negotiation agent, II, attempts to fuse the negoti-
ation with the information that is generated both by and
because of it. To achieve this, it draws on ideas from infor-
mation theory rather than game theory. II decides what to
do - such as whether to bid in an auction - on the basis of
information that may be qualified by expressions of degrees
of belief. II uses this information to calculate, and contin-
ually re-calculate, probability distributions for that which
it does not know. One such distribution, over the set of all
possible deals, expresses II's belief in the acceptability of
a deal. Other distributions attempt to predict the behavior
of its opponents - such as what they might bid in an auc-
tion. These distribution are calculated from II's knowledge
and beliefs using maximum entropy inference. II makes no
assumptions about the internals of its opponents, including
whether they have, or are even aware of the concept of, util-
ity functions. II is purely concerned with its opponents' be-
havior - what they do - and not with assumptions about
their motivations.
Maximum entropy inference is chosen because it en-
ables inferences to be drawn from incomplete and uncer-
tain information, and because of its encapsulation of com-
mon sense reasoning [4]. Unknown probability distribu-
tions are inferred using maximum entropy inference [5] that
is based on random worlds [6]. The maximum entropy
probability distribution is "the least biased estimate pos-
sible on the given information; i.e. it is maximally non-
committal with regard to missing information" [7]. As ap-
plied to the analysis of auctions, maximum entropy infer-
ence presents four difficulties. First, it assumes that what
the agent knows is "the sum total of the agent's knowl-
edge, it is not a summary of the agent's knowledge, it is
all there is" [4]. This assumption referred to as Watt's As-
sumption [8]. So if knowledge is absent it may do strange
things. Second, it may only be applied to a consistent set
of beliefs - this may mean that valuable information is
destroyed by the the belief revision process that copes with
the continuous arrival of new information. Third, its knowl-
edge base is expressed in first-order logic. So issues that
468
have unbounded domains - such as price - can only be
dealt with either exactly as a large quantity of constants
for each possible price, or approximately as price inter-
vals. This decision will effect the inferences drawn and
is referred to as representation dependence [6]. Fourth,
maximum entropy can be tricky to calculate - although
here the equivalent maximum likelihood problem for the
Gibbs distribution [9] was solved numerically without inci-
dent by applying the Newton-Raphson method to as many
non-linear, simultaneous equations as there are beliefs in
the knowledge base. Despite these four difficulties, maxi-
mum entropy inference is an elegant formulation of com-
mon sense reasoning. Maximum entropy inference is also
independent of any structure on the set of all possible deals.
So it copes with single-issue and multiple-issue negotiation
without modification. It may also be applied to probabilis-
tic belief logic. These properties are particularly useful in
analyzing auctions and bidding.
The information-theory oriented analysis described
here, which employs maximum entropy inference, is re-
ferred to as ME in contrast to GT.
2 BiddingAgent II
The form of negotiation considered is between bidding
agents and an auctioneer T in an information rich envi-
ronment. The agent described here is called the Bidding
Agent, or II, it engages in auctions with a set of S op-
ponents {nI,'" ,ns}. General information is extracted
from the World Wide Web using special purpose bots that
import and continually confirm information that is then rep-
resented in pre-specified predicates. II receives informa-
tion by observing its opponents {nil and from these bots.
The integrity of information decays in time. Little ap-
pears to be known about how the integrity of information,
such as news-feeds, decays. One source of information is
the signals received by observing the behavior of the oppo-
nent agents both prior to a negotiation and during it. For
example, if an opponent bid $8 in an auction for an iden-
'cal good two days ago then my belief that she will bid
'$8 now could be 0.8. When the probability of a decaying
belief approaches 0.5 the belief is discarded.
2.1 Agent Architecture
The agents communicate using the following predicate:
Bid(.), where Bid(o) means "the sender bids a deal 0". A
deal is a pair of commitments on:n (7r, w) between an agent
II and an opponent agent n, where 7r is II's commitment
and w is n's commitment. 'D = {Od~I is the deal set -
ie: the set of all possible deals. If the discussion is from the
point of view of a particular agent then the subscript "II:"
may be omitted, and if that agent has just one opponent
that the "n" may be omitted as well. These commitments
may involve multiple issues and not simply a single issue
such as trading price. The set of terms, T, is the set of
all possible commitments that could occur in deals in the
deal set. An agent may have a real-valued utility function:
U : T ---+ 1R, that induces a total ordering on T. For any
deal 8 = (7r,w) the expression U(w) - U(7r) is called the
surplus of 0, and is denoted by L( 0) where L : TxT ---+ ~.
For example, the values of the function U may expressed
in units of money. It may not be possible to specify the
utility function either precisely or with certainty. This is
addressed in Sec. 4 where a predicate Accept(.) represents
the acceptability of a deal.
II has a knowledge base lCand a belief set B. Each of
these two sets contains statements in a first-order language
E. lC contains statements that are generally true. The be-
lief set B = {,6d contains statements, ,6i, that are each
qualified with a given sentence probability, B(,6i) that rep-
resents the agent's belief in the truth of the statement. The
integrity of the statements in B may decay in time. The
distinction between the knowledge base lC and the belief
set B is simply that lC contains unqualified statements and
B contains statements that are qualified with sentence prob-
abilities. This apparently odd distinction is made because
lC and B play different roles in the method described in
Sec.2.2.
II's actions are determined by its "strategy". A strat-
egy is a function S : lC x B ---+ A where A is the set of
actions. The idea is that at certain distinct times the func-
tion S is applied to lC and B and the agent does something.
The set of actions, A, is limited to sending Bid(.) mes-
sages to the auctioneer T. The way in which S works is
described in Sec. 5. In between the discrete times at which
S is activated, information may arrive. Incoming informa-
tion from all sources is time-stamped and placed in an "In
Box", X, as it arrives. Then, momentarily before the S
function is activated, a "revision function" R is activated:
R: (X x lC x B) ---+ (lC x B). R clears the "In Box", and
updates lC and B to ensure consistency. It is not described
here.
2.2 Maximum Entropy Inference
II uses maximum entropy inference. Let g be the set of all
positive ground literals that can be constructed using the
predicate and function symbols in Z. A possible world is
a valuation function v : g ---+ {T, ..1}. That is, a possible
world assigns either true (T) or false (..i) to each ground
literal in g. V denotes the set of all possible worlds, and
V IC denotes the set of possible worlds that are consistent
with the agent's knowledge base lC [6].
A random world for lC is a probability distribution
W IC = {pd over VIC = {vd, where W IC expresses an
agent's degree of belief that each of the possible worlds is
the actual world. The derived sentence probability of any
sentence a in L, with respect to a random world W IC is:
Pw,C<a) ~ 2:) Pn : a is T in v-, } (1)
n
That is, we only admit those possible worlds in which a is
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true. A random world W!C is consistent with the agent's
beliefs B if: (Vf3 E B)(B(f3) = rwx:;(f3)). That is, for
each belief its derived sentence probability as calculated
using Eqn. 1 is equal to its given sentence probability.
The entropy of a discrete random variable X with
probability mass function {Pi} is defined in the usual way
[5]: H(X) = - L:nPn 10gPn where: Pn 2: 0 and
Ln Pn = 1. Let W {!C,B} be the "maximum entropy
probability distribution over V!C that is consistent with B".
Given an agent with K and B, its derived sentence proba-
bility for any sentence, 0", in E, is:
P(O") = PW{lC,B} (0") (2)
Using Eqn. 2, the derived sentence probability for any be-
lief, /3i' is equal to its given sentence probability. So the
term sentence probability is used from here on without am-
biguity. IT uses maximum entropy inference which attaches
the derived sentence probability to any given sentence 0".
3 Representation Dependence
ME is criticized [6] because the way in which the knowl-
edge is formulated in K and B determines the values de-
rived. This property is promoted here as a strength of the
method because the correct formulation of the knowledge
base, using the rich expressive power of first-order proba-
bilistic logic, encapsulates features of the application at a
fine level of detail.
Price is a common issue in auction and market appli-
cations. Two ways of representing price in logic are: to
establish a logical constant for each possible price, and to
work instead with price intervals. Admitting the possibility
of an interval containing just one value, the second gener-
alizes the first. To represent price using price intervals, we
have to specify the "width" of each interval. Suppose in an
application an item will be sold in excess of $100. Suppose
the predicate TopBid(D, 8) means "8 is the highest price
that agent n is prepared to bid". This predicate will satisfy:
Vxy((TopBid(D,x) 1\ TopBid(D,y)) ~ (x = y)). A crude
representation of the set of possible bids is as two logical
constants in E: [100,200) and [200,00). Following the de-
velopment in Sec. 2.2, there are two positive ground literals
in Q: TopBid(D, [100,200)) and TopBid(D, [200,00)), and
there are three possible worlds: {(1.., 1..), (T, 1..), (1..,Tn.
In the absence of any further information, the maximum
entropy distribution is uniform, and, for example, the prob-
ability that D's highest bid > $200 is i. Now if the set
of possible bids had been represented as three logical con-
stants: [100,150), [150,200) and [200,00], then the same
probability is -!. Which is correct: i or -!? That depends
on IT's beliefs about D. In both of these examples, by using
ME, and by specifying no further knowledge about Top-
Bid(.), we have implicitly asserted that the probability of
each possible world being the true world is the same. In
the first example all three are i,and in the second all four
are -!. This is what happens when the "maximally noncom-
mittal" distribution is chosen. Conversely, if believe that:
Vx,y(r(TopBid(D,x)) = r(TopBid(D,y))) then it is not
necessary to include this in lC - it is implicitly present and
we should appreciate that it is so. Sec. 1 mentioned Watt's
Assumption, that assumption says more than it might at
first appear to.
Following from the previous paragraph with just two
logical constants, suppose the predicate MayBid(D, 6)
means "n is prepared to make a bid of 6". Assuming the D
will prefer to pay less than more, this predicate will satisfy:
K;1 : Vx,y((MayBid(D,x) 1\ (x?: y)) ~ MayBid(D,y)),
where x and y are intervals and the meaning of ">"
is obvious. With just K;I in K there are three possible
worlds: {(1.., 1..), (T, 1..), (T, Tn. The maximum entropy
distribution is uniform, and, IP'(MayBid(D, [100,200))) =
~' and lP'(MayBid(D, [200,00])) = !. With no addi-
tional information, lP'(TopBid(D, x)) will be uniform and
r(MayBid(D, x)) will be linear decreasing in x.
An exemplar application is used following. It con-
cerns the purchase of a particular second-hand motor ve-
hicle, with some period of warranty, for cash. So the two
issues in this negotiation are: the period of the warranty,
and the cash consideration. The meaning of the predicate
MayBid(D, 8) is unchanged but 8 now consists of a pair
of issues and the deal set has no natural ordering. Sup-
pose that IT wishes to apply ME to estimate values for:
lP'(MayBid(D,8)) for various 8. Suppose that the war-
ranty period is simply 0,··· , 4 years, and that the cash
amount for this car will certainly be at least $5,000 with
no warranty, and is unlikely to be more than $7,000 with
four year's warranty. In what follows all price units are
in thousands of dollars. Suppose then that the deal set
in this application consists of 55 individual deals in the
form of pairs of warranty periods and price intervals: {
(w, [5.0, 5.2)), (w, [5.2, 5.4)), (w, [5.4, 5.6)), (w, [5.6,
5.8), (w, [5.8, 6.0», (w, [6.0, 6.2)), (w, [6.2, 6.4)), (w,
[6.4, 6.6)), (w, [6.6, 6.8», (w, [6.8, 7.0)), (w, [7.0, 00))
}, where W = 0, ... ,4. Suppose that IT has received in-
telligence that agent D is prepared to bid 6.0 with no war-
ranty, and to bid 6.9 with one year's warranty, and IT be-
lieves this with probability 0.8. Then this leads to two
beliefs: /31 : TopBid(O, [6.0,6.2)); B(/31) = 0.8, /32 :
TopBid(l, [6.8,7.0)); B(f32) = 0.8. Following the discus-
sion above, before "switching on" ME, IT should consider
whether it believes that IP'(MayBid(D, 8)) is uniform over
8. If it does then it includes both /31 and /32 in B, and cal-
culates W {/C,B} that yields estimates for lP'(MayBid(D, 6))
for all 6. If it does not then it should include further knowl-
edge in K and B. For example, IT may believe that D is
more likely to bid for a greater warranty period the higher
her bid price. If so, then this is a multi-issue constraint,
that is represented in B, and is qualified with some sentence
probability.
4 From Utility to Acceptability
One aim of this discussion is lay the foundations for a nor-
mative theory of auctions and bidding that does not rely
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on knowledge of an agent's utility, and does not require an
agent to make assumptions about her opponents' utilities
or types, including whether they are aware of their utility
[10]. Such a theory must provide some mechanism that de-
termines the acceptability of a deal; ie: the probability that
the deal is acceptable to an agent. Agent, II, is attempt-
ing to buy or bid for a second-hand motor vehicle with a
specific period of warranty as described in Sec. 3. Here, II
is bidding in a multi-issue auction for a vehicle, where the
two issues are price and warranty period. Possible rules for
this auction are described in Sec. 5.
The proposition (Accept(o) I I,) means: "II will be
comfortable accepting the deal 0 given that II knows infor-
mation I, at time t". In an auction for terms w, IT's strategy,
S, may bid one or more 71" for which IP(Accept( (71", w)) I
I,) 2: a for some threshold constant a..This section de-
scribes how II estimates: IP(Accept(o) I I,), The meaning
of Accept( 0) is described below, it is intended to put II in
the position "looking back on it, I made the right decision
at the time" - this is a vague notion but makes good sense
to the author.
With the motor vehicle application in mind,
IP'(Accept(o) I I,) is derived from conditional probabilities
attached to four other propositions: Suited(w), Good(n),
Fair(o), and Me(o). meaning respectively: "terms w are
perfectly suited to II's needs", "0 will be a good agent for
IIto be doing business with", "0 is generally considered to
be a fair deal at least", and "on strictly subjective grounds,
the deal 0 is acceptable to II". These four probabilities are:
IP'(Suited(w) I I,), IP(Good(O) I I,),
IP'(Fair(o) I I, U {Suited(w) , Good(O)}) and IP(Me(o) I
I, U {Suited(w), Good(O)}).
The last two of these four probabilities factor out both the
suitability of w and the appropriateness of the opponent
n. The third captures the concept of "a fair market deal"
and the fourth a strictly subjective "what w is worth to II".
The "Me(.)" proposition is closely related to the concept
of a private valuation in game theory. This derivation of
P(Accept(o) I I,) from these four probabilities may not be
suitable for assessing other types of deal.
IP(Fair(o) I I, U {Suited(w), Good(O)}) is de-
termined by reference to market data [11]. Sup-
pose that recently a similar vehicle sold with three
year's warranty for $6,500, and another less similar
was sold for $5,500 with one year's warranty. These
are fed into It and are represented as two beliefs in
B: 133 : Fair(3, [6.4, 6.6)); $(133) = 0.9, 134 :
Fair(3, [5.4,5.6)); $(134) = 0.8. In an open-cry auction
one source of market data is the bids made by other agents.
The sentence probabilities that are attached to this data may
be derived from knowing the identity, and so too the rep-
utation, of the bidding agent. In this way the acceptability
value is continually adjusted as information becomes avail-
able. In addition to 133 and 134, there are three chunks of
knowledge in K. First, /'1,2 : Fair( 4, 4999) that determines
a base value for which IP(Fair) = 1, and two other chunks
that represent IT's preferences concerning price and war-
Figure 1. Acceptability of a deal
Internet Market data
P(Me(O» P(Fair(O»
P( Accept(O) 11t) Agent IT
ranty:
J);3: Vx,y,z((x > y) -> (Fair(z,x) -> Fair(z,y)))
J);4 : "Ix, y, z((x > y) -> (Fair(y, z) -> Fair(x, z)))
The deal set is a 5 x 11 matrix with highest interval
[7.0,(0). The three statements in K mean that there are 56
possible worlds. The two beliefs are consistent with each
other and with K. A complete matrix for P(Fair(o) I It)
is derived by solving two simultaneous equations of degree
two. As new evidence becomes available it is represented
in B, and the inference process is re-activated. If new evi-
dence renders B inconsistent then this inconsistency will be
detected by the failure of the process to yield values for the
probabilities in [0, 1]. If B becomes inconsistent then the
revision function R identifies and removes inconsistencies
from T3 prior to re-calculating the probability distribution.
w=o w=l w=2 w=3 w=4
p = [7.0,00) 0.0924 0.1849 0.2049 0.2250 0.2263
P = [6.8,7.0) 0.1849 0.3697 0.4099 0.4500 0.4526
P = [6.6,6.8) 0.2773 0.5546 0.6148 0.6750 0.6789
P = [6.4,6.6) 0.3697 0.7394 0.8197 0.9000 0.9053
P = [6.2,6.4) 0.3758 0.7516 0.8331 0.9147 0.9213
P = [6.0,6.2) 0.3818 0.7637 0.8466 0.9295 0.9374
P = [5.8,6.0) 0.3879 0.7758 0.8600 0.9442 0.9534
P = [5.6,5.8) 0.3939 0.7879 0.8734 0.9590 0.9695
P = [5.4,5.6) 0.4000 0.8000 0.8869 0.9737 0.9855
p = [5.2,5.4) 0.4013 0.8026 0.8908 0.9790 0.9921
P = [5.0,5.2) 0.4026 0.8053 0.8947 0.9842 0.9987
The two evidence values are shown above in bold face.
The whole "accept an offer" apparatus is illustrated
in Fig. 1. The in-flow of information from the Internet, the
market and from the opponent agents is represented as I,
and is stored in the knowledge base K and belief set B.
In that Figure the D symbols denote probability distribu-
tions as described above, and the 0 symbol denotes a single
value. The probability distributions for Me(o), Suited(w)
and Fair( 0) are derived as described above. ME infer-
ence is then used to derive the sentence probability of the
P(Accept (0) I I,) predicate from the sentence probabili-
ties attached to the Me, Suited, Good and Fair predicates.




The ME analysis of auctions focuses on what agents actu-
ally do rather than their reasons for doing what they do. The
four common auction mechanisms are considered for an
auctioneer, 1, a single item and multi-issue bids each con-
sisting of a set of deals. In the Dutch auction the auctioneer
calls out successive sets of deals until one bidding agent
shouts "mine". In the first- and second-price, sealed-bid
mechanisms, bidding agents submit any number of multi-
issue bids. The "Australian" mechanism is a variant of the
common English mechanism in which agents alternately
bid successive sets of deals until no further bids are re-
ceived - as each set of deals is received the auctioneer
identifies the current winning bid. So, unlike in the multi-
issue English mechanism, in the Australian mechanism the
auctioneer is not required to publicize fully her winner de-
termination criterion in advance, and the bidders are not
required to submit successive bids that are increasing with
respect to that criterion. In the two sealed-bid mechanisms
and the Australian mechanism the auctioneer determines
the winner - and the runner up in the second-price mech-
anism - using a preference ordering on the set of all pos-
sible deals that may be made known to the bidding agents.
The bids in these auctions may contain a large number of
deals which is rather impractical.
Consider what happens from the auctioneer's point of
view. T's expectation of what might happen will rely on
both an understanding of the motivations and strategies of
the agents taking part, and the rules of the auction mech-
anism. These two matters will effect T's choice of deal
set, but otherwise the analysis is the same for the four
common auction mechanisms. Suppose that there are 8
agents, {Qdr=1' bidding in the auction, and the value set,
V = {15d~1' contains D elements. Suppose that 1 has
a total preference ordering, ~1' on the deal set, V, and
that V is labeled such that if i > j then 15i ~1 15j. Let
the predicate TopBid(Q, (5) now mean "deal 15 is the high-
est bid that Q will make with respect to the order ~1'"
There are 8 x D ground literals in terms of this predicate.
This predicate will satisfy: "'7 : Vixy((TopBid(Qi, x) 1\
TopBid(Qi, y)) -; (x = y)). Suppose that the deal set,
V, has been chosen [see Sec. 3] so that 1 expects each
of the (D + 1)8 possible worlds that are consistent with
"'7 to be equally probable for TopBid(.) for each Qi for
i = 1, ... , 8. I The maximum entropy distribution is uni-
form and VijJP>(TopBid(Qi, 15j» = D~1' Let the predi-
cate WinningBid( (5) mean "deal 15is the highest bid that the
{Qdr=1 will make with respect to the order ~1'" Then:
"'8 : Vi(WinningBid(15i) +--+ (.?JjkTopBid(Qj, 6k) 1\ (k >
i)) 1\ (?JnTopBid(Qn, 6i)). There are now (8 x D) + D
ground literals in terms of these two predicates, but still
1This is the symmetric case when the expected performance of each of
the 8 bidding agents is indistinguishable.
only (D + 1)8 possible worlds. So:
JP>(WinningBid(6i) = (1 _ D - i)8 x (1 _ (_i_)8)D+l i+l
For example, if 8 = 2 and D =-0 3 then the probability
of the highest of the three possible deals being bid by at
least one of the two agents is 176' If the total ordering ~l
is established by a utility function then this result enables
the estimation of the expected utility." The analysis com-
pleted so far may be applied to any sealed-bid auction, or to
any open-cry auction prior to any bids being placed. Once
the bidding starts in an open-cry auction, information about
what agents are, or are not, prepared to bid is available.
This information may alter a bidding agent's assessment of
the acceptability of a deal by feeding into the Fair(.) pred-
icate - see Sec. 4. It also alters the assessments of the
probabilities of what the various opponents will bid, and
of any deal being the winning bid. Bids made in an Aus-
tralian auction provide lower limits, and bids not made in a
Dutch auction provide upper limits, to what the opponents
will bid.' As these limits change the assessment of these
probabilities are revised. A formula for JP>(WinningBid( 6;))
in terms of these limits is rather messy." The value derived
for W(WinningBid( 6i)) relies on "'7 and "'8 in K, together
with expressions of the observed limits and the assumed
expectation that each possible world is equally probable for
TopBid(.).
Now consider the four auctions from a bidding agent's
point of view. Two strategies, S, for bidding agents are de-
scribed for illustration only. First, a keen agent who prefers
to trade on any acceptable deal to missing out - they are
not primarily trying to optimize anything - although in
the Australian auction they may choose to bid strategically,
and may attempt to reach the most acceptable deal possi-
ble. Second, a discerning agent who attempts to optimize
expected acceptability, and is prepared to miss out on a deal
as a result.
First, consider keen agents. In a first-price, sealed-
bid auction these agents will bid the entire set {15 I
W(Accept( (5) I Id :::::a}. In an Australian, open-cry auc-
tion these agents agent may attempt to submit bids that
are just "superior" to the bids already submitted by other
2 In the continuous GT analysis, if Xi is a random variable representing
the amount bid by fli' and if the distributions for the Xi are uniform on
[0, 1] then the expected value of the winning bid is given by the expected
value of the 8th order statistic E(X(s» = S~l'
3This is the asymmetric case.
4In the continuous GT analysis, given a sample of S non-identical,
independent random variables {Xi} 7= 1 where Xi is uniform on [Ci' 1].
For each sample, Pi = lP(Xi 2: X) = {~2 if c, S X S 1 and zero
otherwise. So the probability that none of the Xi exceed Y 2: max{Ci}
is lP(Y) = n;=l (1 - p;) = nf=l ~~g:which is the probability
distribution function for the largest Y. Then E(Y) = J;:~ax{Cd Y x
fey) x dY where fey) = mf=l ~~g;)x (2:;=1 Y~Ci)' For
example, for 8 = 2, Cl = C, C2 = d. 0 ::; C S d S 1 then E(Y) ==
4-(3Xd)-d3+(3xcx(d2-1» d if - d - 0 th !C'(Y) - ~ s we
6X(1-c)X(l-d) ,an 1 C - - en Ie. - 3 a
expect.
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agents. The meaning of "superior" is determined by ~1
and may be private information. If a bidding agent does not
know ~1 then it will have to guess and assume it. Suppose
that A is the set of bids submitted so far by the opponents
in an Australian auction. First define the set of bids that are
just superior to A: A+ = {o E V I 0 ~ A,:301 E A,O ~1
01, V'02((0 ~1 02 ~1 od ---+ ((02 = 0) V (02 = 01)))}.
Now bid {arg max, {JP>(Accept( 8) I It) I (JP>(Accept( 8) I
It) ~ 0:) A (5 E A+)} }. To avoid bidding against itself in a
Vickrey auction an agent will bid a set of deals that forms a
shell,~, with respect to ~1 [ie: V5i5j E ~(--,(5i ~1 5j))].
An agent will only bid in a Vickrey auction if ~1 is known,
because that ordering will determine the "highest" non-
winning bid. This uncertainty makes the Vickrey auction
less attractive to keen agents than the other three forms. If
keen agents do not feed bidding information into their ac-
ceptability mechanism in the open-cry cases, then the ex-
pected revenue will be greatest in the first-price, sealed-bid,
followed by the Dutch and then by the Australian - it is
not clear how the Vickrey auction fares due to the uncer-
tainty in it. Feeding bidding information into the accept-
aility mechanisms of keen agents may have an inflation-
'My effect on expected revenue in an Australian auction,
and bidding non-information may have a deflationary ef-
fect in the Dutch auction. The extent to which these effects
may change the expected-revenue ordering will be strategy-
specific.
Second, consider discerning agents. A similar analy-
sis to the above may be used by a discerning agent to opti-
mize expected acceptability in the symmetric case. This
analysis follows the general pattern of the standard GT
analysis for utility optimizing agents - see for example
[12] - it is not developed here. For a discerning agent,
the Vickrey mechanism has a dominant strategy to bid at,
and the Australian mechanism right up to, the acceptability
margin. For the Dutch and first-price mechanisms, the ac-
ceptability of the deals bid will be shaded-down from the
margin. In both the Dutch and the Australian mechanisms,
the margin of acceptability may move as bidding informa-
tion becomes available.
6 Conclusion
Auctions have been considered from the point of view of
agents that bid because they feel comfortable as a result
of knowledge acquisition, rather that being motivated by
expected utility optimization. Information is derived gen-
erally from the World Wide Web, from market data and
from observing the behavior of other agents in the market.
The agents described do not make assumptions about the
internals of their opponents. In competitive negotiation,
an agent's motivations should be kept secret from its op-
ponents, So speculation about an opponent's motivations
necessarily leads to an endless counter-speculation spiral
of questionable value. Maximum entropy inference is em-
inently suited to this requirement, and has the additional
bonus of operating with logical constants and variables that
represent individual deals. So the deals may be multi-issue.
Four simple multi-issue auction mechanisms have been an-
alyzed for two classes of agent: keen agents that are primar-
ily motivated to trade, and discerning agents that are pri-
marily motivated by the optimization of their expected ac-
ceptability. The acceptability mechanism generalizes game
theoretic utility in that acceptability is expressed in terms
of probabilities that are dynamically revised during a ne-
gotiation in response to both changes in the background
information and the opponents' actions.
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